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SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER
TRANSNATIONAL SECURITIES FRAUD
CASES: ZOELSCH v. ARTHUR ANDERSEN
&CO.
When American securities laws are applied in the context of
international transactions, complex jurisdictional issues arise.1 Although section 272 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act")3 confers on the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction
I See Note, ExtraterritorialBoundaries of Federal Securities Law, 50 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 417, 417 (1975) [hereinafter Note, ExtraterritorialBoundaries]; Comment, The Transnational Reach of Rule 10b-5, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1370 (1973). Recognizing that international securities transactions may involve conduct both within and without the United
States, one commentator noted, "[t]he relevant question, then, becomes: what event or combination of events within the United States is sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction?" Id. See also Note, The ExtraterritorialApplication of the Antifraud Provisions of
the Securities Acts, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 137, 137 (1978) [hereinafter Note, The ExtraterritorialApplication of the Antifraud Provisions] (increasing international security transactions mandate application of United States law where jurisdiction exists in order to "protect
American investors and safeguard the integrity of domestic securities markets").
2 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982). This section provides that, "[tihe district courts of the
United States... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this title or the rules and
regulations thereunder." Id.
' Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. 1987)) [hereinafter Exchange Act]. The
Exchange Act was promulgated "in order to protect interstate commerce, the national
credit, the Federal taxing power, to protect and make more effective the national banking
system and Federal Reserve System, and to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets." 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982). One commentator has divided the purposes of the Exchange
Act into four categories: (1) disclosure; (2) prevent and afford remedies for fraud or market
manipulation; (3) regulate securities markets; and (4) control the amount of the Nation's
credit which goes into those markets. 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 130-31 (2d ed.
1961); see Peoples Sec. Co. v. SEC, 289 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1961) (the basic purposes of
the Exchange Act were: to force disclosure of information to investors, to regulate markets,
and to control the Nation's credit in such markets); see also Radzanower v. Touche Ross &
Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976) (primary purpose to assure fair dealing without undue preferences or advantages among investors); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,
849 (1975) ("The primary purpose.., was to eliminate serious abuses in a largely unregulated securities market.").
Prior to the Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (1982 & Supp. 1987)) [hereinafter Securities Act], the federal
government's sole recourse for securities fraud was criminal prosecution under the mail
fraud statute. See 3 L. Loss, supra, at 1421. The Exchange Act must be distinguished from
the Securities Act which "is concerned by and large with the initial distribution of securities
rather than subsequent trading." 1 L. Loss, supra, at 130. See Peoples Sec. Co., 289 F.2d at
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over violations of the act, it indicates no jurisdictional perimeters.'
Because of the paucity of information as to the legislative intent5
and the failure of the Securities and Exchange Commission6 to
clarify the jurisdictional scope of section 10 or Rule 10b-5, s federal
271; Tracy & MacChesney, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 MICH. L. REV. 1025,
1037-38 (1934).
" See, e.g., Continental Grain (Australia) Party, Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d
409, 415 (8th Cir. 1979) (scheme of fraudulent nondisclosure involving the use of mail and
telephone will provide a jurisdictional basis in the United States); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d
109, 114 (3d Cir.) (jurisdictional basis exists when at least activity in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme occurs in the United States), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); Bersch v.
Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir.) (no jurisdictional basis exists when acts
abroad outweigh preparatory acts and acts of nonfeasance in the United States), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
The Exchange Act exempts from coverage the securities transactions of a foreign business. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1982 & Supp. 1987). Section 30(b) provides:
The provisions... shall not apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business
in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States, unless he transacts such
business in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate to prevent the
evasion of this title.
Id. See also Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 207 (2d Cir.) (purpose of § 30(b) is "to
permit persons in the securities business to conduct transactions in securities outside of the
United States without complying with the burdensome reporting requirement of the Act"),
rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906
(1969). The Schoenbaum court held that section 30's exemption "does not preclude extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act to persons who engage in isolated foreign transactions." Id. at 207. The SEC has not promulgated any rules or regulations under section 30.
Id. at 207 n.4. See 2 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1170 n.2. See also Goldman & Magrino, Some
Foreign Aspects of Securities Regulation: Towards a Reevaluation of Section 30(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 55 VA. L. REv. 1015, 1020 (1969) ("Although no rules or
regulations have been promulgated ... under Section 30(b), SEC rules promulgated under
various other statutory provisions may impliedly serve to prevent 'evasion of this title' ");
Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 69 COLUM. L.
REv. 94, 101-03 (1969) (discussing § 30 and Schoenbaum).
I See Kasser, 548 F.2d at 114 n.21. See generally Mizrack, Recent Developments in the
ExtraterritorialApplication of Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
30 Bus. LAW. 367, 368 (1975).
a 15 U.S.C § 78d (1982 & Supp. 1987). Section 4 created the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Id. See generally 1 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 131 (SEC given considerable rulemaking authority).
15 U.S.C § 78j (1982). Section 10 of the Exchange Act provides, inter alia:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
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courts have themselves determined the reach of American law over
cases involving transnational transactions.' In an effort to ascertain
proper boundaries, the courts have drawn upon international law1°
Id. Interstate commerce is broadly defined in section 78c to include "trade, commerce,
transportation, or communication among the several [s]tates, or between any foreign country and any State." Id. § 78c(a)(17). Section 10 is a general provision, proscribing fraud and
manipulation on the national exchange and over-the-counter markets. See 1 L. Loss, supra
note 3, at 131.
8 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987). Rule 10b-5, promulgated under section 10, makes it
unlawful:
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
, See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir.
1972) ("language of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act is much too inconclusive to lead
us to believe that Congress meant to impose rules governing conduct throughout the world
in every instance where an American company bought or sold a security"). See also IIT v.
Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975) ("the line has
to be drawn somewhere if the securities laws are not to apply in every instance where something has happened in the United States"); Note, ExtraterritorialBoundaries,supra note 1,
at 417-18 nn.3-8 (discussion of federal court decisions on jurisdictional issues in cases involving foreign parties).
1oSee Comment, supra note 1, at 1369-70. Under international law a state can predicate jurisdiction on the following bases: (1) the territorial principle-a state has jurisdiction
over conduct within its territory; (2) the objective territorial principle-a state can regulate
conduct occurring outside its territory if the conduct produces an effect within its territory;
(3) the nationality principle-a state has jurisdiction over the conduct of its citizens
whether or not the conduct occurs within its territory; (4) the passive personality principle-a state has jurisdiction over conduct which injures its citizens; (5) the protective principle-a state may attach legal consequences to conduct that threatens its national security;
or (6) the universality principle-a state has jurisdiction over an act if it has custody of the
person who committed the act. See id. at 1368-69. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES §§

10, 17, 18, 19, 20, 26, 27, 30, 33 (1965 &

Supp. 1986-87) (discussing various bases of jurisdiction) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
Of these jurisdictional guidelines, the territorial or "conduct" approach and the objective territorial or "effects" approach have been used by the courts to determine subject
matter jurisdiction over transnational claims under the antifraud provisions of the Exchange
Act. See, e.g., Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334, 1339 (subject matter jurisdiction recognized in place
where conduct has occurred); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.) (subject
matter jurisdiction "to protect the domestic securities market from the effects of improper
foreign transactions in American securities"), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). See also Note, American Adjudication of
TransnationalSecurities Fraud,89 HARv. L. REv. 553, 554-57 (1976) (discussion of subjective and objective territorial principles as applied in Second Circuit cases).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:129

to formulate tests focusing on the "effects"" of and the "con-

duct"'12 constituting, the alleged violation. Although the "effects"
test has been uniformly applied throughout the federal circuits, 3
11See supra note

10. The "effects" test is formulated in the RESTATEMENT which states:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to
conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if
either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements
of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal
systems, or
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which
the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a
direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule
is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized by states that
have reasonably developed legal systems.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 18. See also Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206 ("effect" on
American securities market sufficient to confer jurisdiction).
12 See

supra note 10. The

RESTATEMENT'S

"conduct" test provides:

A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory,
whether or not such consequences are determined by the effects of the conduct
outside the territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in its
territory.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 17. See also Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334, 1339 (place where
conduct occurred used to determine jurisdiction).
S See, e.g., Continental Grain (Australia) Party, Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d
409, 417 (8th Cir. 1979) (jurisdiction based on effects test); Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp.,
549 F.2d 133, 135 (9th Cir. 1977) (jurisdiction over securities transaction outside United
States involving foreign parties where American buyers, sellers and holders of those securities were adversely affected); Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 208-09 (serious effect on United
States commerce supported jurisdiction).
The Second Circuit established the effects test in Schoenbaum, holding that an American court has jurisdiction over violations of the Exchange Act where the conduct, outside
the United States, was intended to produce and did produce detrimental effects within the
United States. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 208-09. The transaction in Schoenbaum, involved
stock registered and listed on a national securities exchange and the court limited the "effects" test's applicability to transactions which involved stock listed on a national exchange
and which were "detrimental to the interests of American investors." Id. at 208. The conduct cannot be entirely outside the United States; the use of interstate commerce, the mails,
or a national securities exchange is a prerequisite for subject matter jurisdiction under the
antifraud provision of the Exchange Act. See id. at 207 n.2. See also 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982)
(use of mails or national securities exchange for deceptive purposes is prohibited). See generally 3 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1519-24 (much of the SEC's ability to prevent fraudulent
activity is dependent upon showing use of the mails or national securities exchange).
In subsequent cases the Second Circuit clarified the "effect" necessary to predicate jurisdiction. In Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1018 (1975), generalized effects, such as the ability of American firms to obtain investment
capital from foreign sources, or deterioration of investor confidence in American underwriters at home and abroad, were held to be insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction.
See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 987-88. The Second Circuit's formulation has been applied by other
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varying degrees of "conduct" in the United States have been required to confer subject matter jurisdiction.14 Recently, in Zoelsch
v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,'

5

the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia held that subject matter jurisdiction
over transnational fraud cases, involving a foreigner as plaintiff, requires domestic conduct that constitutes all of the elements of a
10b-5 violation. 6
In Zoelsch, a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany
brought an action in the District of Columbia on behalf of himself
and other West German investors 17 against Arthur Andersen &
Co., an American general partnership.' 8 Zoelsch asserted that he
relied upon false representations and material omissions in an audit report, distributed with a package of materials describing an
intricate investment and tax shelter plan.' 9 The investment vehicle
was offered exclusively in West Germany, to West German citizens.20 Zoelsch alleged federal jurisdiction on the basis of claims
under United States securities laws and diversity of citizenship. 2 '
The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.22 On appeal, the circuit court affirmed.23 Judge
Bork, writing for the court, analyzed the statutory language and
federal circuits. See, e.g., Continental Grain,592 F.2d at 417 (losses by foreign subsidiary of
American corporation not a substantial effect under the effects test).
14 Compare ITT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975) (jurisdiction based on
"conduct" limited to perpetration of fraudulent act) with SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d
Cir.) (activity designed to "further a fraudulent scheme" can justify jurisdiction), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
1- 824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Is Id. at 35.
17Id. at 28. There were at least thirty-one other West German citizens who, along with
Zoelsch, invested their funds directly with Dr. Loescher and Co. KG ("Loescher") or indirectly through a West German limited partner of Loescher with the understanding that the
funds would be funnelled through these entities to First American International Real Estate
Limited Partnership ("FAIR"). Id. FAIR was to invest the money in property and condominium conversions in Tennessee and Georgia. Id.
18Id. Zoelsch brought the action in the United States only against Arthur Andersen &
Co. ("AA-USA") and filed, in West Germany, another suit against Arthur Andersen & Co.
Gmbh ("AA-Gmbh"), a West German limited liability corporation. Id. at 29.
19Id. at 28. Loescher commissioned AA-Gmbh to prepare an audit report on the entire
investment plan, including the American investments. Id. AA-USA's sole connection with
the package of solicitation materials distributed by Loescher was one minor reference to
Arthur Andersen & Co., Memphis in the audit report prepared by AA-Gmbh. Id. at 29.
20 Id. at 28.
21 Id.
22 Id. Plaintiff did not challenge the denial of subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship; he appealed only the lack of jurisdiction over the federal claims. Id.
23 Id.
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case law supporting the "conduct" tests.24 Based on its analysis,
the court adopted the Second Circuit's restrictive test by requiring
that solely domestic acts comprise the elements of a 10b-5 violation.25 The court offered three rationales to support its decision:
unless a contrary intent appears, legislation "is meant to apply
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States";"
American judicial resources should be preserved for the "adjudication of domestic disputes and the enforcement of domestic law";27
and the circuits adopting more permissive tests did so for "reasons
2
that were essentially legislative.1
Although concurring in the majority's decision to dismiss the
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Chief Judge Wald rejected the majority's rationale, which had classified the adoption of
the permissive approach as essentially legislative.29 Furthermore,
Chief Judge Wald found it "unnecessary . . .to adopt the Second
Circuit's restrictive test" because federal jurisdiction would not exist under the less restrictive approaches.3 0
While the court in Zoelsch reached the correct decision on
these specific facts, it is submitted that the adoption of a more
rigorous standard was unnecessary and will diminish the Exchange
Act's significance in regulating the securities industry. This Comment will examine the disparate "conduct" tests which have
emerged in the federal circuits. In addition, it will be asserted that
the Zoelsch court's reason for rejecting the permissive test was inherently flawed. Lastly, a three-prong test will be proposed to enable the courts to effectuate the Exchange Act's purpose, while still
addressing incidental problems in applying American laws to
transnational activities.
24 See id. at 29-33. The court reviewed the restrictive Second Circuit interpretation and
the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits' more lenient approaches, see infra notes 30-50 and
accompanying text, and concluded that the Second Circuit's test "provides the better approach to determining when American courts should assert jurisdiction." Zoelsch, 824 F.2d
at 31.
25 See Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 31.

26

Id. (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949)).

27

Id. at 32.

28

Id.

Id. at 36 (Wald, C.J., concurring).
10 Id. (Wald, C.J., concurring); see also infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text (discussion of less restrictive approaches).
29

1987]

JURISDICTION OVER SECURITIES
VARYING THE REQUIRED DEGREE OF CONDUCT

In a line of cases from Leasco Data Processingv. Maxwell31 to
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,Inc.,32 the Second Circuit, using international law as a benchmark, 3 developed a test basing jurisdiction
on domestic conduct.3 4 Although the Second Circuit relied on the
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States ("Restatement"),35 it did not extend jurisdiction to the
Restatement's limits. 3 6 Instead, Bersch restricted jurisdiction by

requiring different degrees of conduct, for resident Americans,
nonresident Americans and foreigners.3 7 The Bersch court distinguished between these classes of plaintiffs because of a "concern
for overburdened federal courts." 38 Under this distinction, domes'"

468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).

32 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).

11 See supra note 10. See also Note, The ExtraterritorialApplication of the Antifraud
Provisions, supra note 1, at 138 (jurisdictional theories of international law serve as guidance for the court).
" See supra note 10. The test is an extension of the subjective territorial principle of
foreign relations law, which gives a state jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce a rule of law
"attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory." RESTATEMENT,
supra note 10, § 17. See also supra note 12 (text of § 17).
RESTATEMENT, supra note 10.

See supra note 12. Under the Restatement approach, conduct within a territory is
sufficient for jurisdiction. Id. In Leasco, the court recognized that under the Restatement
the court was not precluded from applying the Exchange Act but added, "[tihe question
remains whether we should." Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d
1326, 1335 (2d Cir. 1972). In Bersch, the court reiterated Leasco's contention that a court
must determine if Congress meant to go to the "full extent permitted." Bersch, 519 F.2d at
985 (quoting Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334). The Bersch court then addressed this concern and
limited the Restatement's approach by requiring increased degrees of conduct for different
categories of plaintiffs. See id. at 993; infra note 36 and accompanying text.
11 Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993. A tripartite test was established, providing:
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws:
(1) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident in the
United States whether or not acts (or culpable failures to act) of material importance occurred in this country; and
(2) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident abroad if,
but only if, acts (or culpable failures to act) of material importance in the United
States have significantly contributed thereto; but
(3) Do not apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners outside the
United States unless acts (or culpable failures to act) within the United States
directly caused such losses.
Id.
38 Id. at 985. After analyzing foreign relations law, the court stated that a court "must
seek to determine whether Congress would have wished [that] the precious resources of
United States courts .. .be devoted to [predominantly foreign transactions] rather than
leave the problem to foreign countries." Id. But see infra note 68 and accompanying text.
'
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tic conduct that is "merely preparatory" is sufficient to confer jurisdiction in a nonresident American's action; whereas, domestic
conduct must "directly cause" the injury in an action brought by
foreign parties. 9 In IT v. Vencap, Ltd.,40 Bersch's companion
case, the court further defined "directly caused," holding that conduct sufficient for jurisdiction over claims by foreigners is limited
to the "perpetration of fraudulent acts themselves."4 1 Although the
other circuit courts agree that jurisdiction can be premised on conduct occurring in the United States,4 2 they are not in accord as to
the conduct necessary to trigger the application of American securities laws to actions brought by foreign citizens.'3
The Third and Eighth Circuits have not applied as stringent a
definition for "directly caused" as was enunciated by the Second
Circuit. 44 In SEC v. Kasser,4 the Third Circuit, noting that jurisdiction would be found under the Second Circuit's test,4' set forth
a more permissive test requiring only "some activity designed to
47
further a fraudulent scheme" be conducted in the United States.
The Kasser court suggested that a more permissive test would further the purpose of the Exchange Act 8 by: discouraging the use of
the United States as a base of operations for the defrauding of for3' Bersch, 519

F.2d at 992.
10 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
"' Id. at 1018. The court noted that jurisdiction "does not extend to mere preparatory
activities or the failure to prevent fraudulent acts where the bulk of the activity was performed in foreign countries." Id. But see SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114-15 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); FEDERAL SECURrrms CODE § 1604 (Proposed Official Draft
1978); see also Loss, Externality in the Federal Securities Code, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 305
(1978) (discussion of type of activity generally required to find jurisdiction in the United
States).
42 See, e.g., Continental Grain (Australia) Party, Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d
409 (8th Cir. 1979); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976); SEC v. United
Fin. Group, 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973).
" Compare ITT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975) (jurisdiction in action
brought by foreigner requires domestic conduct to be fraudulent act itself) with Continental
Grain (Australia) Party, Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979) (requires
domestic conduct to significantly further fraudulent scheme's accomplishment) and Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1983) (adopting Eighth Circuit test).
" See supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
45 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
40 Id.
at 113-15. In obvious deference to the Second Circuit, the Kasser court struggled
to reconcile its holding with "the prior pronouncements of... the Second Circuit, a court
with especial expertise in matters pertaining to securities." Id. at 115.
47 Id. at 114.
" See supra note 3.
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eigners;4 9 encouraging international cooperation against fraudulent
schemes; 50 and, increasing the SEC's ability to vigorously police
51
the conduct of securities transactions within the United States.
The Eighth Circuit, in Continental Grain (Australia)Party,
Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc.,52 also repudiated the Second Circuit's
restrictive test5 3 and instead required that the conduct in the
United States significantly advance a fraudulent scheme's accomplishment and involve the mails or other instrumentalities of interstate commerce.5 4 The Eighth Circuit noted that policy reasons
postulated in Kasser supported the adoption of a more permissive
test, but the court declined to adopt a requirement as permissive
as was suggested by the Third Circuit.55
ANALYSIS OF Zoelsch

The D.C. Circuit's adoption of the Second Circuit test is
flawed in three respects: the court adopted a more demanding test
than that of the Second Circuit; the court's rationale for rejecting
the permissive test was inherently defective; and the court's distinction between foreigners and nonresident Americans raises constitutional objections.
In IIT v. Cornfeld, 6 the Second Circuit retreated from its
prior holdings.57 The court stated that in determining whether
49 Kasser, 548

F.2d at 116. The Kasser court realized that:
to deny such jurisdiction may embolden those who wish to defraud foreign securities purchasers or sellers to use the United States as a base of operations.... We
are reluctant to conclude that Congress intended to allow the United States to
become a "Barbary Coast," as it were, harboring international securities "pirates."

Id.
50 See id. Seeking to further international cooperation, the Kasser court recognized
that "a holding of no jurisdiction might induce reciprocal responses on the part of other
nations.... By finding jurisdiction here, we may encourage other nations to take appropriate steps against parties who seek to perpetrate frauds in the United States." Id. It is submitted that this rationale is applicable where the defendant is an American citizen or entity
but might not be appropos where the defendant is a foreign citizen or entity. See generally
3 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1852-61; 6 id. at 4004-07 (2d ed. Supp. 1969) (enforceability of
SEC liabilities in foreign forums).
5'Kasser, 548 F.2d at 116.
52 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979).

13See id. at 413-19.
51 Id. at 421.
'5 Id. at 418-20. While the Kasser court found the conduct in the United States was
significant to the completion of the fraud, the court interpreted the holding to require only
"some activity designed to further a fraudulent scheme." Kasser, 548 F.2d at 114.
ra 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
57Compare IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding subject matter juris-
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American activities "directly caused" the injury it must balance
the quantity of conduct in the United States against the quantity
of conduct abroad.58 The court also noted that it was not inclined
to extend Bersch's holding to include "cases where conduct was
predominantly in the United States and the securities were American in practical effect."5 9 In AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Investment Partnership,0 the court further distanced itself from its
prior holdings by applying the Tentative Draft of the Restatement
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States ("Tentative Draft")6 1 analysis, in determining the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction,6 2 even though the fraud was consummated
diction where a foreign plaintiff purchased convertible debentures in the European
aftermarket, since the prospectus was drafted and the accounting done in the United States,
though the debentures were not offered in the United States) with F.O.F. Proprietary
Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young & Co., 400 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (denying jurisdiction
where foreign plaintiff purchased debentures, issued and guaranteed by American companies, from a foreign underwriter, even though defendants had drafted a misleading circular
and letter in the United States; fraud held to consist of the communication of the misleading information and the sale to the foreigners-both of which had occurred abroad).
HT,
I8 619 F.2d at 920-21.
Id. at 921 n.13.
00 740 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1984)
01

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

OF THE UNITED STATES

(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981) [hereinafter TENTATIVE DRAFT].
82 AVC Nederland B.V., 740 F.2d at 154-55. Although the fraud was consummated
abroad, the court found jurisdiction would exist under the TENTATIVE DRAFT'S approach. Id.
But see Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (declined to

adopt the

TENTATIVE DRAFT's

approach contending that it would make "jurisdiction turn on

a welter of specific facts" and yet adopted a test which also turns on the specific facts of the
case). The court in Cornfeld noted that "'the presence or absence of any single factor which
was considered significant in other cases dealing with the question of federal jurisdiction in
transnational securities cases is not necessarily dispositive' in future cases." 619 F.2d at 918
(quoting Continental Grain (Australia) Party, Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409,
414 (8th Cir. 1979)).
The Second Circuit's "fact specific" approach is exemplified by seemingly contradictory
results. Compare F.O.F. Proprietary Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young & Co., 400 F. Supp. 1219
(S.D.N.Y 1975) (misleading circulars and reports drafted in United States, with distribution
of circulars and sale of debentures outside the United States, considered actual 10(b) violation) with lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 411 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (drafting of a memorandum with misstatements and omissions in the United States, with the distribution to European purchasers from the Bahamas, considered a violation within United States), on
remand from 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Comment, Securities Law-Subject
Matter Jurisdictionin TransnationalSecurities Fraud,9 INT'L L. & POL. 113, 136-37 (1976)
(fraud committed when misleading information was given to the victim) [hereinafter Comment, Transnational Securities Fraud]. It is submitted that, under the Second Circuit's
approach, a company could manufacture fraudulent securities devices in the United States,
send them abroad to another company, and defraud foreigners with no fear of retribution as
long as they do not keep assets in the foreign country.
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abroad."' It is submitted that by requiring domestic conduct to
constitute all the elements of a 10b-5 violation, the D.C. Circuit
adopted a test for a foreign plaintiff's action no longer followed in
the Second Circuit.
The D.C. Circuit justified utilization of a stricter standard by
citing a canon of statutory construction, 4 expressing a concern for
the overburdening of the courts, 5 and characterizing the more permissive circuits' reasoning as "legislation."6 6 The canon, that unless a contrary intent appears legislation is meant to apply only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, has been
found by the Second Circuit itself to be inapposite where there has
been significant conduct within the territory.6 7 The second policy
03 AVC Nederland B.V., 740 F.2d at 148, 153. Jurisdiction was denied, however, because of a choice of forum and law clause in the agreement. See id. Section 403(2) of the
TENTATIVE DRAFT provides:
Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable is judged by evaluating all the
relevant factors including:
(a) the extent to which the activity (i)
takes place within the regulating state,
or (ii) has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the regulating
state;
(b) the links, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the
regulating state and the persons principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the law or regulation is designed to
protect;
(c)the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of the regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted;
(d)the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation in question;
(e) the importance of regulation to the international political, legal or economic system;
(f)the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity;
(h)the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states.
TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 61, § 403(2). For a discussion of the TENTATIVE DRAFT's approach, using "reasonableness" as the determinative factor for subject matter jurisdiction,
see Note, Subject Matter JurisdictionOver TransnationalSecurities Fraud: A Suggested
Roadmap to the New Standard of Reasonableness, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 919 (1986).
14 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
"1 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
', See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
'7 Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972).
The court stated:
Conduct within the territory alone would seem sufficient from the standpoint of
jurisdiction to prescribe a rule. It follows that when, as here, there has been sig-
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rationale-preventing the overburdening of the federal courtsmay be valid; however, it seems relatively insignificant if the plaintiff will be denied a remedy, 8 or the failure to find jurisdiction will
allow a defendant to continue to defraud foreigners with impunity. 9 The final rationale offered censures the other circuits as
usurping the role of Congress."0 The cases categorically state that
the legislative intent of the extraterritorial applications cannot explicitly be found in the statute or the legislative history.7 1 In construing an ambiguous statute, a court should look to the statute's
purpose. 2 It is submitted that the circuit courts adopting the more
permissive tests examined the overall purpose of the statute and
construed it properly, and the D.C. Circuit erred in classifying such
73
efforts as essentially legislative.
nificant conduct within the territory, a statute cannot properly be held inapplicable simply on the ground that, absent the clearest language, Congress will not be
assumed to have meant to go beyond the limits recognized by foreign relations
law.
Id. The court added that reliance on Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949), which
stated that regulatory statutes will generally not be construed as applying to conduct wholly
outside the United States, is misplaced. Id.
"' See Note, Expanding the JurisdictionalBasis for Transnational Securities Fraud
Cases: A Minimal Conduct Approach, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 308, 315 n.47 (1983). One commentator has noted that "concern of overburdening the federal courts may be valid. However, it is not so strong an argument as to deny a plaintiff his right to a remedy, especially if
this is the only country in which personal jurisdiction may be obtained over the defendant."
Id.
69 See Petition for Rehearing for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 10, IT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d
909 (2d Cir. 1980). The SEC argued, "the possibility of the wastefulness of a court in this
country adjudicating conduct which may be better policed by a foreign state must be
weighed against the possibility that abstention by the court would create gaps in international regulation through which a modern-day pirate may safely sail." Id.
70 See Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 36-37 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Wald,
C.J., concurring).
7' See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
72 Day v. North Am. Rayon Corp., 140 F. Supp. 490, 493 (E.D. Tenn. 1956). See also
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 463 (1892) (the evil the statute was
designed to remedy is a guide to its meaning); Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 271 Pa. 378, 390,
114 A. 825, 829 (1921) ("[s]tatutes framed in general terms apply to new cases that arise,
and to new subjects that are created from time to time, and which come within their general
scope and policy") (quoting 25 Ruling Case Law 778); Note, Subject Matter Jurisdictionin
TransnationalSecurities Frauds, 3 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 1305, 1314 (1976) (must look to purpose of the statute). But see also People ex rel. Fyfe v. Barnett, 319 Ill. 403, 408-09, 150
N.E. 290, 292 (1926) ("statutes are to be construed as they were intended to be understood
when they were passed. Statutes are to be read in the light of attendant conditions and that
state of the law existent at the time of their enactment").
71 Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 37 (Wald, C.J., concurring) (rejecting the court's rationale for
disgarding the more permissive approaches and labeling their efforts as an attempt to usurp
the role of Congress).

JURISDICTION OVER SECURITIES

1987]

A final criticism of the D.C. Circuit's decision is its perpetuation of the foreigner/nonresident-American dichotomy by the imposition of a more exacting requirement on foreign plaintiffs.7 4
This oppressive provision raises constitutional issues, specifically,
infringement on equal protection rights.7 5
It is submitted that the adoption of a stricter standard was
unnecessary and will diminish the fundamental purpose of the Exchange Act; namely, "to achieve a high standard of business ethics
in the securities industry. 7'6 Therefore, it would have been preferable for the court to adopt the Eighth Circuit's permissive test 77 or
alternatively to adopt a new three-prong test employing the restrictive and permissive tests coupled with the Tentative Draft's
proposals to determine whether jurisdiction would be "unrea7' 8
sonable.
AN ALTERNATIVE TEST FOR DETERMINING JURISDICTION

An alternative test initially would determine whether jurisdiction exists under the restrictive test developed in Leasco Data
ProcessingEquipment Corp. v. Maxwell and its progeny.79 If jurisdiction is established, the court would be required to exercise it.80
74 See id. at 32.

71 See U.S. CONsT. amend. V. See also Note, American Adjudication of Transnational
Securities Fraud,89 HARv. L. REV. 553, 569 (1976) ("[tlhe Second Circuit's distinction between Americans and foreigners seems ... unwise as a matter of United States constitutional law"); Comment, Transnational Securities Fraud, supra note 62, at 133 ("[e]qual
protection questions are raised by the imposition on foreigners of more onerous requirements for jurisdiction"); Comment, The TransnationalReach of Rule 10b-5, 121 U. PA. L.
REv. 1363, 1378 (1973) ("classifications of aliens ... have been held to be suspect classifications which can only be justified by a showing of a compelling state interest").
71 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). See also supra note
3 (discussion of Exchange Act).
77 See Zoesch, 824 F.2d at 33 n.3. The Third Circuit's approach may be an aberration,
justified only by the fact that the SEC had brought the action and therefore different standards may be applicable in private actions. See id. But see IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d
1001, 1017-18 (2d Cir. 1975) (where there is "subject matter jurisdiction over a suit by the
SEC to prevent... securities frauds ... there would also seem to be jurisdiction over a suit
for damages or rescission by a defrauded foreign individual").
78 TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 61, § 403(2). See also AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium
Inv. Partnership, 740 F.2d 148, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1984) (applied TENTATIVE DRAT'rs factors for
determining unreasonableness).
70 See supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
80 It is submitted that by limiting mandatory jurisdiction to defendants who pass the
restrictive test the court will be able to weigh the problem of overburdened courts as a
factor in the third prong and thereby allow a court to address the policy which permeated
the Second Circuit's decisions.
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However, if jurisdiction is not established, the Eighth Circuit's
more permissive test s ' would be applied in the second prong. A
finding of jurisdiction under this second prong would then require
the court to apply the Tentative Draft's factors to determine
whether the assertion of jurisdiction would be unreasonable under
the third prong.8 2 It is suggested that if jurisidiction is not established under the permissive test or the exercise of jurisdiction is
unreasonable under the Tentative Draft's balancing test, the case
should then be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Moreover, making jurisdiction discretionary under the third prong
would enable the court to evaluate the burden on the courts and
weigh that along with other relevant interests; thereby, addressing
the concerns of the Second Circuit, without losing sight of the Exchange Act's underlying purpose.
CONCLUSION

The D.C. Circuit has perpetuated the foreigner/nonresidentAmerican dichotomy by requiring foreigners to satisfy a stricter
test to gain access to American forums. By denying access to foreign plaintiffs, the court will, in effect, encourage unscrupulous individuals to use the United States as a base for fraudulent
schemes, 3 and thereby undermine the purpose of the Exchange
Act; namely, "to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the
securities industry. 8 4 It is urged that under the position adopted
by the D.C. Circuit, America will soon become a "'Barbary Coast,'
as it were, harboring international securities 'pirates,' "85 an outcome not beneficial to American interests and one the other circuits have attempted to prevent.
Andrew R. Schleider

, See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
8, See supra note 63 (listing of TENTATIVE DRAFT'S factors).
83 See, e.g., F.O.F. Proprietary Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young & Co., 400 F. Supp. 1219
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (rejecting subject matter jurisdiction where misleading offering circulars
prepared in the United States were used to defraud investors abroad).
8, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). See supra note 3.
83 See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).

